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“Fly Home Ye Ravens!”: How the FCC’s Abandonment of
Broadband Regulation Will Harm Music Diversity
By Luke Batty1
Citing supposed harms to competition among Internet service
providers, the 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order reverses a
decade long push to implement a regime of broadband regulation
protecting net neutrality. However, the 2017 Order failed to recognize
non-pecuniary interests in its sweeping change. Critical infrastructure,
national security, and democracy all rely on a free and open Internet.
Music creates an outlet for diverse cultural and individual
representation, allowing artists and audiences to participate in
democratic dialogues by creating and listening to music. The music
industry shifted to online streaming as the primary market for artists
to reach audiences. The possibility of instant global access for creators
and audiences alike relies on an Internet free from blocking, throttling,
and prioritization arrangements by Internet service providers. If
Internet services providers exercise their gatekeeping capabilities, as
courts have anticipated and the 2017 Order permits, artists will be
forced to rely more substantially on outdated markets where their
individual creativity may be stifled. The argument that audience
demand will preserve worthy artists fails because it ignores creators'
contributions as inherently relevant to democracy. In addition, the
audience will be less accessible as Internet service providers will exert
greater control over the availability of streaming services and social
media platforms provided to their users through prioritization and
zero-rating arrangements. Music embodies the broad, democratic
character of the Internet that the 2017 Order ignores and trivializes;
arguably, fatally so.
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INTRODUCTION
Before riding her horse into a bonfire, Brünnhilde releases
Wotan’s ravens to spread the flames, thus completing Richard
Wagner’s “Ring Cycle” in Götterdämmerung.2 Brünnhilde’s aria ends
with her self-immolation, as the funeral pyre engulfs all of Valhalla and
its gods, bringing the end of the world.3
Enter our twenty-first century Brünnhilde, FCC Chairman Ajit
Pai. The FCC’s repeal of net neutrality protections4 is nothing less than
an apocalyptic divestment of the agency’s duties and regulatory
authority. The FCC’s Restoring Internet Freedom Order (the “2017
Order”) changes and attacks the character of the Internet as the
foundation for modern speech and democratic debate. In the spirit of
Wagner, the casualties of the FCC’s proposal include niche music
genres that challenge perceptions of artistry and cultural norms.5 Rather
than leading to a rebirth and renewal, the FCC’s repeal of Tittle II
protections turns control of the Internet over to Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) who the FCC’s rules will allow to block, throttle, or
require payment for Internet priority or protection against Internet
degradation due to ISP management.6

2

RICHARD WAGNER, GÖTTERDÄMMERUNG, 61-62 (Oliver Ditson Co. 1926) (1876).
Id. at 62. See also WILLIAM O. CORD, AN INTRODUCTION TO RICHARD WAGNER’S DER RING
DES NIBELUNGEN, 10 (1983) (“The poem relates the actions that lead to and conclude with the
destruction of the ancient gods, the doom of the corrupt world they had shaped, and the rebirth of
the universe.”).
4
Restoring Internet Freedom, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 82 Fed. Reg. 25568, (rel. May 23,
2017) (hereinafter Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM); Proposal to Restore Internet Freedom,
Public Draft (proposed Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.fcc.gov/document/proposal-restore-internetfreedom (hereinafter Restoring Internet Freedom Draft Order); Restoring Internet Freedom, 83
Fed. Reg. 7852 (Feb. 22, 2018) (hereinafter Restoring Internet Freedom Order).
5
See Cord, supra note 3, at 6 (“[Wagner’s] ideas did not represent mere modifications or
alterations. Rather, they advocated a completely new and radically different operatic tradition….
The practiced and the professional, the famous and the near-famous, the scholar and the artist
lifted their pens in denunciation of his ideas.”).
6
Restoring Internet Freedom Draft Order, supra note 4, ¶ 235.
3
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While the Internet created some hurdles for musicians and
copyright holders,7 the overall advantages of global networking offered
profound and positive impacts on artists. Selling merchandise,
announcing events, and increased outlet diversity helped artists thrive.8
Artists no longer had to rely on major labels or broadcasters to pick up
their songs in order to distribute them. In addition to streaming and
MP3 file sharing, subcultures and forums arose to advance niche music
genres. For example, the online forum Reddit has a growing catalogue
of “recommended niche” genres available for perusal: the classical
genre network has thirteen subgenres listed; electronic music has an
more than eighty linked subgenre forums; the combined rock/metal
category has nearly as many subgenre communities.9 This rich cultural
network of music styles could not exist without regulations protecting
a truly free and open Internet.
The repeal of net neutrality deserves review as it impacts music
diversity, a valuable democratic and cultural asset. First, the legal
history of net neutrality leading up to the repeal of the 2015 Open
Internet Order (the “2015 Order”) will contextualize the new regulatory
regime. Second, music diversity will be defined and recognized as a
valued part of democracy, framing the effects of the 2015 Order. Third,
the paper will demonstrate how the prospective consequences of the
FCC’s repeal will harm music diversity by giving broadband providers
more power over content creators, regressively forcing artists into
markets subject to the FCC’s “public interest” standard. Finally, the
public interest standard will be analyzed as adverse to music diversity.
I.

LEGAL HISTORY OF NET NEUTRALITY

The FCC’s 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (the “NPRM”) indicated the FCC’s intent to adopt
regressive policies that would prevent equal Internet access and
distribution of information.10 The proposal sought to repeal the
agency’s 2015 Open Internet Order.11 Namely, the FCC announced
7

See, e.g., A&M Records v. Napster Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); MGM Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
8
See Casey Rae-Hunter, Licensing, Access, and Innovation in the New Music Marketplace, 7 J.
BUS. & TECH. L. 35, 39 (2012). See also Alliance for Media Arts & Culture et al., Comment Letter
on Restoring Internet Freedom, WC Docket No. 17-108 (Aug. 30, 2017) (“Under the existing
open Internet rules, anyone with a robust broadband or mobile connection can reach users,
promote their work and sell creative products and services without having to ask permission or
pay a toll to an ISP.”).
9
Subreddits by Genre, REDDIT (last visited Oct. 27, 2018),
https://www.reddit.com/r/Music/wiki/musicsubreddits.
10
See generally Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 4.
11
Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 4, ¶ 24. See also, In the Matter of Protecting
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their plan to revert broadband providers’ classification as
telecommunication services back to information services, thus
removing the limited common carriage restrictions the 2015 Order
imposed.12 The FCC spent several years trying to impose regulations
on broadband providers because the agency believed broadband
providers were exercising unfair competitive advantages by funneling
user traffic to its own content and applications.13 The FCC also sought
to protect the Internet’s open character which it characterized as an
engine of innovation.14 Ironically, the general implications and risks of
repealing net neutrality are best presented by studying the FCC’s prior
attempts at regulation. Therefore, the legal history and evaluation of
the current state of issues are best presented hand-in-hand.
The Communications Act of 1934 created the FCC to regulate the
use of the electromagnetic spectrum.15 In addition to this general grant
of authority, certain spectrum-based industries and practices were also
recognized for more specific regulation under the 1934 Act.
Specifically, the FCC was tasked with licensing spectrum for
broadcasting16 and enforcing common carriage requirements under
Title II.17 Under Title II, common carriers are for-hire services that
provide an indiscriminate outlet for users to both receive and send
information.18
The development of broadband required the FCC to determine
how to regulate the internet and broadband providers as Internet service
progressed from private-to-public telephone lines to a network of
cable, fiber, and wireless connections as last-mile delivery
mechanisms.19 The majority of net neutrality regulations have focused
and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) (hereinafter 2015 Open Internet
Order).
12
Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 4, ¶ 25.
13
See Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642, 644 (2010). Comcast allegedly throttled peer-topeer services. See also, Verizon v. Fed Comm. Comm’n, 740 F.3d 615, 623 (2014). Verizon
allegedly throttled Apple’s FaceTime app to incentivize the use of its own Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) application.
14
Open Internet Order, supra note 11, ¶ 2; Verizon, 740 F.3d at 634.
15
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, Title I, sec. 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 151).
16
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, Title III, sec. 301, 48 Stat. 1064, 1081
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 301).
17
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, Title II, sec. 201, 48 Stat. 1064, 1070
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 201).
18
47 U.S.C. § 153(11) (2012). See also, United States Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 825 F.3d 674,
707 (D.C. Cir 2016) (“[C]ommon carrier obligations [require] broadband providers to offer
indiscriminate service to edge providers.”).
19
See Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, and Deep-Packet Inspection: The Role of
the Federal Trade Commission Act's Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions in the Net Neutrality
Debate, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 652-59 (2009).
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on whether broadband providers should be regulated under the FCC’s
general authorization to manage wired and wireless communications
per Title I of the Communications Act of 1934 or alternatively whether
broadband providers are subject to some form of common carriage
standards under Title II. During the 1960s-1980s, the FCC developed
several frameworks for considering prospective regulations on the
Internet and computer networks.20 First, the FCC recognized the four
parties involved in Internet use: (1) broadband lines (the infrastructure
of the network), (2) broadband providers (the subscription services
permitting access to the Internet as Internet service providers), (3) edge
providers (online content creators and services), and (4) end users
(edge providers’ audience and broadband providers’ customers).21
Computers were categorized into “basic” and “enhanced services”
regarding their participation in telecommunication services.22 Under
Computer Inquiry II (Computer II) adopted in 1980, the FCC defined
“basic services” as the systems of communications where the digital
and analog voice, video, and data were transmitted without being
altered in form or stored.23 Under Computer II, any service that stored
or modified the information, namely through user input, qualified as an
“enhanced service.”24 While basic services had an enforceable duty to
serve the public as common carriers, enhanced services operated on a
client-by-client basis, creating content and services as well providing
the materials to an audience.25
Congress codified this framework in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 (the “1996 Act”). Under the 1996 Act, basic services were
recognized as “telecommunications services,” subject to common
carriage restrictions.26 Enhanced services, including broadband
providers, were reclassified as “information services.”27 During this
20

See Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Communication Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (Mar. 18, 1971) (“Computer Inquiry I”);
Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second Computer
Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, ¶¶ 6-7 (May 2, 1980) (“Computer Inquiry II”); Amendment of Sections
64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C.2d 958
(June 16, 1986).
21
See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, ¶ 20 (2010).
22
Computer Inquiry II, supra note 20, ¶ 97.
23
Computer Inquiry II, supra note 20, ¶ 95. See also, Robert Cannon, The Legacy of Federal
Communications Commissions’ Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 183-84 (2003).
24
Computer Inquiry II, supra note 20, ¶ 5.
25
See Cannon, supra note 23, at 183-84.
26
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 3(a)(48-51), 110 Stat. 56, 60
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 153).
27
Sec. 3(a)(41), 110 Stat. at 59. But see Cannon, supra 23, at 191-92. Cannon points out some
differences between the enhanced services and information services designations based on the
different uses of telecommunications versus telecommunications services.
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time, Internet service providers were only subject to common carriage
requirements in their role as a dial-up service accessing telephone
lines.28
Following the 1996 Act, the Supreme Court analyzed the
statutes to interpret whether cable broadband providers fell into the
information or telecommunications services. The split between
Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia in National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services prompted the
FCC’s campaign to enact net neutrality protections over the following
decade.29 Thomas, writing for the majority, held that the agency
reasonably interpreted that broadband providers did not offer
telecommunications because even though broadband services used
telecommunications to deliver Internet connection, providers did not
independently offer telecommunications, independent of the
communications service, and therefore could not be treated as
telecommunications services.30 Scalia’s dissent attacked this
interpretation, claiming that broadband service could not be separated
from telecommunications service based on the shared infrastructure.31
The dissent provided a prophetic view of society’s growing reliance on
Internet, and provided the allegory of the pizza parlor: if a pizza parlor
refuses to “offer” delivery but will bring the pizza to the customer’s
house as part of a “pizzeria-pizza-at-home service,” the parlor does in
fact offer delivery.32 A separate delivery service, according to
Thomas’s view, would independently offer delivery of other
restaurant’s pizza. To Scalia, the inseparable nature of broadband
access and its method of delivery provide not only a more reasonable
and pragmatic view, but arguably the only reasonable interpretation
when compared to Thomas’s semantics.
Following Brand X, the FCC proscribed its Internet policy
objectives and created a set of voluntary principles for broadband
providers to further these objectives.33 Soon after, Comcast tested the
FCC’s ability to enforce these “voluntary” principles by throttling peerto-peer communications in 2007.34 The FCC claimed they were
authorized to regulate broadband providers under an ancillary
28

See Sandoval, supra note 19, at 653.
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
30
Id. at 988-89.
31
Id. at 1006 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32
Id. at 1007 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC
Rcd. 14986, at ¶ 4 (Sept. 23, 2005).
34
Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 28 FCC Rcd. 13028 (Aug. 20, 2008).
29
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jurisdiction theory.35 Specifically, the agency pointed to a policy
statement in the 1996 Act promoting the FCC’s purpose under Title I
to increase the public’s Internet and telecommunications access via
broadband providers.36 The Commission also defended the legitimacy
of the voluntary principles based on Justice Thomas’s approval of
exercising such enforcement under ancillary jurisdiction in Brand X.37
The FCC argued that Comcast’s degradation of data transmissions
directly conflicted with the agency’s goals to increase “rapid” and
“efficient” Internet access across the country.38 Essentially, a
broadband provider was operating spectrum in the form of wired
communications contrary to the public interest, requiring an FCC
intervention.
The court held that the FCC lacked congressional authorization to
implement anti-discriminatory regulations.39 Specifically, the FCC had
misplaced its reliance on Section 706 of the 1996 Act because a prior
FCC order only considered the section a policy statement proposing the
FCC regulations advance public broadband access at reasonable rates
rather than a statutory authorization.40 Therefore, the FCC lacked
regulatory authority absent a change in their own record reconsidering
whether Section 706 constituted an independent grant of authority. The
FCC could not ground its rulemaking authority in independent policy
statements.41 Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C. proved that the FCC’s voluntary
principles were toothless.
Following Comcast, the FCC changed its interpretation of Section
706. The 2010 Open Internet Order specifically reclassified Section
706 as an independent statutory grant of authority.42 With this newly
minted authority, the FCC imposed transparency requirements, antidiscrimination and anti-blocking limits on broadband providers.43
These rules intended to protect the “virtuous circle” of innovation as
independent edge providers created content and services for end
users.44 Absent such protections, the FCC believed broadband
35

Id. ¶ 18.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 706, 110 Stat. 56, 153 (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 1302(a)). See also Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642, 658 (D.C. Cir 2010).
37
Brand X, 545 U.S. at 996 (2005) (“[T]he Commission remains free to impose special regulatory
duties on facilities-based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction.”)
38
Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 28 FCC Rcd. at 13036-37, ¶ 16.
39
Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 661.
40
Id. at 658.
41
Id. at 644.
42
Preserving the Open Internet Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, ¶ 117 (Dec. 23, 2010).
43
Id. ¶ 43.
44
Id. ¶¶ 13-17.
36
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providers would exercise gatekeeping control over independent edge
providers, creating a competitive advantage for broadband providers’
own resources.45 For example, Comcast could throttle user traffic to
Google and Yahoo, incentivizing users to Comcast’s own website as a
source of news, web searching, and advertising.
However, these measures also failed in court due to the FCC’s
failure to classify ISPs as common carriers while imposing common
carriage style rules. In Verizon v. F.C.C., the court held that while the
FCC’s new interpretation of Section 706 was reasonable, confirming
that the statute promulgated regulation the FCC could cite to enact
restrictions such as transparency rules that require ISPs to disclose their
network management practice.46 The D.C. Circuit held that the
blocking and non-discrimination rules the FCC adopted as part of the
2010 Order imposed per se common carriage obligations on ISP
without appropriately classifying broadband providers as common
carriers subject to regulation under Title II.47 The court noted that
broadband providers could, and likely would, exercise gatekeeping
control.48
The D.C. Circuit held that 1996 Act specifically exempted
information services from common carriage responsibilities, namely
the duty to serve the public indiscriminately.49 This distinction,
according to the court, permitted broadband providers to discriminate
against edge providers and end users by blocking, restricting, and
preferring competing edge providers unless the FCC classified ISPs as
common carriers.50
After licking their wounds for a second time, the FCC returned
with the 2015 Open Internet Order (the “2015 Order”) which aimed to
satisfy the issues preventing common carriage regulations presented in
Verizon.51 First, the FCC restated their updated interpretation of
Section 706 as a statutory grant of authority allowing the FCC to take
action to promote broadband deployment, including action to prevent
Internet discrimination.52 Verizon specifically approved this
45

Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623, 646 (2014).
Id. at 659.
47
Id. at 655-56.
48
Id. at 646 (“[B]roadband providers have the technical and economic ability to impose such
restrictions. Verizon does not seriously contend otherwise. In fact, there appears little dispute that
broadband providers have the technological ability to distinguish between and discriminate
against certain types of Internet traffic.”).
49
Id. at 646.
50
Id. at 658.
51
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11.
52
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, ¶ 275.
46
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interpretation, thus overcoming the FCC’s error in Comcast Corp.53
Second, the FCC classified ISPs as common carriers, imposing limited
common carrier obligations on ISPs to promote the “virtuous circle”
theory of Internet innovation.54 The 1996 Act borrowed its framework
of telecommunication services from Computer Inquiry II, which
contained three categories: basic services, enhanced services, and
enhanced services that facilitate basic services.55 When the 1996 Act
codified this theory, it silently recognized the third facilitating
category. According to the FCC, information services that facilitate the
distribution of telecommunication services were additionally subject to
common carriage rules.56
The FCC claimed that in their role as telecommunication
facilitators, broadband providers could exercise gatekeeping harmful
to the public, a theory the court in Verizon considered legitimate.57 To
counter the threat of ISP gatekeeping, the 2015 Order provided three
“bright line rules” for broadband providers to follow as common
carriers; no blocking, throttling, or paid prioritization.58 These rules
only amounted to limited common carriage obligations because the
2015 Order allowed application-specific exceptions for reasonable
network management; ISPs could block or throttle as long as it would
be done indiscriminately and “tailored to achieving a limited network
management purpose.”59 However, the 2015 Order created no such
exception for paid prioritization because “paid prioritization is
inherently a business practice rather than a network management
practice.”60
The 2015 Order succeeded where prior attempts to regulate failed.
During litigation, the court upheld the facilitation theory because,
according to the court, broadband providers facilitated the
communication and connection between end users and edge providers
and consequently took on common carriage responsibilities.61 The
2015 Order successfully enacted net neutrality protections.

Verizon, 740 F. 3d at 741 (“We think it quite reasonable to believe that Congress contemplated
that the Commission would regulate this industry, as the agency had in the past, and the scope of
any authority granted to it by section 706(b).”).
54
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, ¶ 283.
55
Computer Inquiry II, supra note 20, ¶ 2-4.
56
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, ¶ 331.
57
Verizon, 740 F.3d at 646.
58
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, ¶¶ 14-19.
59
Id. ¶ 32.
60
Id. ¶ 18 n.18.
61
United States Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 825 F.3d 674, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2016), aff’d, 855 F. 3d
381 (D.C. Cir 2017).
53
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However, the net neutrality regime was short lived. An executive
shakeup placed Ajit Pai as head commissioner of the FCC following
the 2016 Presidential Election. Pai vigorously opposed the 2015 Order
and quickly issued the 2017 NPRM.62 The proposal rejected the 2015
order as a success for the public, seeking a full repeal of the policy.63
The NPRM sought to tear down the common carriage regulations on
broadband providers and utilize ex post enforcement of anticompetitive
violations.64 This would permit broadband providers to discriminate
against edge providers by throttling and blocking content or demanding
fees for preference and access to end users. Considering the outcomes
in Comcast and Verizon, indicating that ancillary jurisdiction is no
more than a fiction and voluntary principles have no legal
ramifications, the FCC would wash their hands clean from broadband
regulation.
In December of 2017, three of the five FCC commissioners passed
the Restoring Internet Freedom Order (the “2017 Order”), repealing
Title II protections.65 The repeal specifically abandons the
classification of ISPs as information services facilitating
telecommunications services, consequently invalidating the
foundations of the limited common carrier obligations, and instead
reinstating ISP’s status as information service providers.66 As a result,
the FCC cannot enforce the limited common carrier provisions set forth
by the 2015 Order’s bright line rules that prevented blocking,
throttling, and paid prioritization because the 2017 Order removes the
regulatory rug out from under enforceable rules to oversee such
behavior. Further confirming the agency’s intent to abdicate its
responsibility to preserve the Internet as a democratic forum, the 2017
Order names the Federal Trade Commission as the enforcing body. 67
As the FTC is limited to preventing anticompetitive practices between
ISPs, and has some jurisdiction to address misrepresentations such as
a mismatch between ISP promises and practices,68 there is apparently
no executive body expressly seeking to preserve the Internet’s
democratic and participatory character. The FCC’s repeal solely
focuses on harms to competition, leaving non-pecuniary harms and
62

Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 4.
Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 4, ¶ 70.
64
Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 4, ¶¶ 76-91.
65
See Cecilia Kang, F.C.C. Repeals Net Neutrality Rules, N.Y.T. (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/technology/net-neutrality-repeal-vote.html.
66
Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 4, ¶ 20.
67
Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 4, ¶ 2.
68
See Sandoval, supra note 19, at 694-95 (arguing that the FTC review ISP disclosures for
deceptive conduct).
63
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interests without a remedy as the Supreme Court has held that antitrust
laws only provide redress for competition harms.69 While the FTC can
foreseeably address mismatches between ISP promises and
performance – such as whether offering “unlimited” plans amounts to
deceptive conduct70 – FTC jurisdiction will not capture the breadth of
harms that can result from ISP blocking, throttling, and paid priority.
The post hoc enforcement method also leaves greater uncertainty as to
the legitimacy of individual practices compared to bright line rules,
assuming the FTC would even pursue such enforcement.
Part of the Internet’s democratic function stems from its
magnificent breadth of content. Music may only be a small part of what
the Internet offers but as an industry, music has adapted and benefitted
from an informational world like few others. Therefore, the relation
between music and the Internet can serve as a case-study to understand
the value of net neutrality. The prospective impacts of repealing net
neutrality policies present substantial dangers to the music as an
industry and an art, and therefore threaten democracy.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE 2015 OPEN INTERNET POLICIES

While many online music innovations predate the 2015 Open
Internet Order, anti-discriminatory policies benefit and protect the
music industry’s online presence. This section will detail three primary
ways artists and copyright holders benefit from a regulatory framework
that preserves net neutrality.
A. Expansion of Music Delivery
For many of these genres, alternative markets and methods of
distribution are limited beyond the internet. Music forums, like certain
divisions on Reddit, allow artists and audiences to share, recommend,
and discuss the subculture where other outlets may not be widely
accessible. For example, “doom metal” is a metal subgenre that draws
influences from progressive and experimental rock from the 1970s and
1980s as well as the original metal band, Black Sabbath.71 The lyrical
content is gloomy and apocalyptic while the music itself is slow and
See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990) (“[I]njury, although
causally related to an antitrust violation, nevertheless will not qualify as ‘antitrust injury’ unless
it is attributable to an anti-competitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny.”). See also Catherine
J.K. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, 9 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 1, 63 (2018) (arguing that the 2017 Order did not address harms to
national security, particularly critical infrastructure).
70
See Sandoval, supra note 19, at 694-95.
71
See Bethany Tiamat, Guide to Metal Subgenres, BEAT (July 2017), https://beat.media/guide-tometal-subgenres.
69
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monotonous with tracks frequently exceeding the twenty-minute mark.
A radio station would likely be unable to consistently draw a
substantial local audience and keep their attention to sustain a doom
metal focused broadcast outlet.
Other genres may not enjoy alternatives markets without
sacrificing artistic integrity. Broadcast is subject to indecency
censorship imposed by government regulation to serve the public
interest, as well as voluntary censoring by the network. 72 Artists can
promote their work uninhibited via the Internet, but radio broadcast
requires edited versions. For example, drill music is a hip-hop subgenre
with a unique Chicagoan gangster rap perspective.73 The content of the
songs may not be radio appropriate, but to restrict the content would
minimize the artist’s viewpoint and voice. The Internet provided a
forum for the Chicago style to reach global audiences. In some cases,
the international response to drill music sought to restrict the art form;
several have attributed violence in the UK to drill music and sought to
quash the genre.74 Without the Internet, subgenres like drill would need
to rely only on live performances and physical records for distribution
because even if the genre had a substantial local following, the
restrictions on the content of the music would inherently detract from
the viewpoint to which the audience relates. Absent a free and open
Internet, genres like drill could also be susceptible to censorship if the
broadband provider so decided based on a fear of liability for violent
acts, no matter how tenuous the relation. Additionally, nothing in the
2017 Order prevents ISPs from accepting money from interest groups,
for instance groups who may find drill music to be a source of violence.
ISPs could then block and throttle certain content without specifically
disclosing that the ISP had done so, as the 2017 Order only requires an
admission that the ISP engages in prioritization arrangements without
disclosing any of the terms, such as the parties or effected content.75
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Some of niche musical genres may have been popular or had a
substantial following for a time, but broadcasting outlets have focused
on newer, more popular works. For example, the Reddit forum
“Outrun” is dedicated to a 1980s retrofuturism aesthetic.76 As an
electronic music subgenre, the synthesizers and drum kits evoke a
soundtrack for Detective Crockett’s Ferrari Testarossa in Miami Vice.
While there may have been a broad audience in the 1980s, the genre
modernly relies on the Internet for artists to spread awareness of their
work.
Modern subgenres may also rely on the Internet to gain attention
in alternative markets saturated by nostalgia and audiences who only
want to hear the hits. Classical music has struggled to attract new
audiences with fresh content. But at the same time, classical
performances and curators are frequently constrained to satisfying
conservative audience tastes.77 Concert programmers choose music
that appeals to the traditional taste (Beethoven, Mozart, Dvorak, etc.)
and may throw in something novel, such as a premiere. However, the
novelty expires following the premiere and the work is often
forgotten.78 Online forums allow composers to find performers and
build a relationship that sustains both parties. Audience-based forums
focus on new or lesser known works that deserve recognition. Twentyfirst century technology allows musicians to find and distribute other
collaborators and works to expand the repertoire.
B. In Defense of Music Diversity
Repealing net neutrality threatens the growing number of niche
genres that have gained a following because they can access audiences
without geographic limitations. Striking down Title II protections
would decimate the artists who have been able to create and distribute
music via the Internet. Ultimately, this new era of music diversity must
be deemed worth protecting. Music diversity is more than a desirable
end. Cultural representation, artistic expression, and democratic
dialogue all factor into music diversity and a repeal would threaten
these values as well.
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The arts are fundamental to culture. The modern philosophy of
aesthetics studies the person’s sensory approach and understanding of
the world around them.79 The role of fine arts, in the broadest possible
definition of the term, within culture allows for the creation and
elevation of expression for profound purposes.80 Classical philosophy
recognized the arts as part of the development of the whole person,
shaping the person’s skills and virtues.81 The United States’ founders
also recognized the value of the arts in society by creating patent and
copyright protections as well as granting broad protection to artistic
expression.82 American culture in the twentieth-century accelerated an
interest in individual development as technology created an optimistic
feeling that human creativity could solve the ills of the world.83 The
arts, including music, are intimately related to person’s ability to
understand themselves. They also present an elevated form of speech
for broadcasting a viewpoint.
Composers, performers, and music enthusiasts on the Internet use
modern technology to promote their own individual development and
increase viewpoint diversity. Online personalities have access to more
venues for discussion and as a result must learn to communicate and
understand others as well as themselves.84 Venues where multiple
personalities can engage each other promote viewpoint diversity and
intercultural communication. Music forums, where people share
musical new works, techniques, and genres provide fertile grounds for
viewpoint diversity.
Art’s connection with an individual is only part of the equation;
art also embodies cultures. Music promotes individual and cultural
viewpoints. For example, drill music could be considered a specific
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sub-genre of trap music, a broader sub-genre of hip hop.85 Drill’s
specificity stems from its focus on Chicago culture. Cultural subgenres are a timeless aspect of music. Christian rock, Argentinian
tango, and “riot grrrl” punk carry cultural elements in their
compositions. Musical subgenres greatly benefitted from a free and
open Internet because it promoted greater representation of individual
and cultural viewpoints.
The FCC has recognized the importance of viewpoint diversity,
especially minority viewpoints, in other contexts. The FCC’s minority
broadcast ownership rules intended to increase the number of
minorities working in radio and broadcasting because it would spur
more culturally reflective content.86 The FCC later abandoned the
policy for failing to meet strict scrutiny,87 but it has never disavowed
the value of viewpoint diversity and the Commission continues to
promote diverse broadcast ownership.
The Restoring Internet Freedom Order may be the closest the FCC
has come to rejecting viewpoint diversity as an agency goal. Both the
draft and final orders limit the public interest concerns that guide
Internet regulation to anti-competitive enforcement and consumer
deception protections, meaning the FCC denied redress for all noneconomic concerns that shape the democratic and participatory nature
of the Internet.88 This specifically omits and contradicts agency
concerns regarding ISPs restricting viewpoint diversity in the 2015
Open Internet Order.89 Abandoning limited common carriage
requirements for post hoc enforcement fails to serve individual speech
interests and stifles intercultural communication.90 Therefore,
repealing Title II protections, which restricts music diversity and
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access to the arts online, directly harms viewpoint diversity and
contradicts the agency’s mission.
C. Internet Streaming
The Internet dramatically increased access to music through ondemand streaming. Previously, if a listener wanted to hear a specific
work, they would need to own a physical copy to play. LP’s, vinyl
recordings, audio cassettes, and CD’s became obsolete once ondemand streaming became available for listeners. Additionally, this
meant the copyright holders, whether it be the music labels or content
creators themselves, also had to adjust their business models. Prior to
online markets, labels and artists focused on broadcast licenses and unit
sales.91 Audience access substituted streaming on-demand music for
unit sales.92 Artists have taken various approaches to increase unit
sales, for example delaying streaming access for a period following the
release, forcing the consumer into a unit sale for on demand listening.93
Another example of an increasingly popular approach, Radiohead’s
2006 digital release of In Rainbows allowed users to choose their price
to download the album.94 This audience controlled model succeeded by
simplifying artist-to-audience content sharing. Radiohead incentivized
purchasers to directly benefit the band rather than a streaming platform,
advertiser, or record label.95
Copyright holders could not adapt a unilateral approach to
streaming services because each platform treated revenue streams and
royalties differently. For example, Apple Music and Tidal classify
themselves as “premium services” because they require a subscription
for revenue.96 Spotify and Pandora introduced “Freemium” services
that provide music streaming for free but rely on ad revenue.97
Streaming services’ diversity also depends on the royalty method they
utilize. Per-stream royalties compensate the rights holder per each play
on the service. Spotify uses a “play-share” method, where the artist
91
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receives a royalty commensurate to their “market share” of the total
plays on the platform over a certain time.98 A faction of artists have
supported a “user-share” model where the rights holder receives
royalties based on the share of plays for each individual user who
streamed their work because in subscription models, it allows the
audience to more directly benefit the artists they actually listen to rather
than paying a portion of their subscription to popular artists, to whom
they may never listen.99 Under other models, more popular artists can
window their releases by delaying streaming access or completely
abstain from streaming services because they can rely on their
following to participate in unit sales.100 Smaller artists typically do not
have the luxury of abandoning streams because niche genres may rely
on those platforms to reach an audience and receive some form of
compensation.
Amongst the different royalty models, a competing “no royalty”
model in the form of digital piracy grew popular. Peer-to-peer services
allowed users to share and access other’s music libraries without
paying and became the primary method of digital piracy.101 Listeners
have also avoided streaming services and unit sales through YouTube.
While rights holders receive royalties for licensed videos on YouTube,
ubiquitous unlicensed videos plague the video service. The
combination of licensed and unlicensed content makes YouTube the
largest music catalogue available online.102 For licensed music,
streaming services pay on average eight-times in royalties more per
play than YouTube.103 While YouTube must remove unlicensed videos
upon request, unlicensed music videos remain available in droves until
those requests are processed and are easily re-uploaded once the video
is taken down.104 As long as YouTube responds to the requests, the site
enjoys “safe harbor” protections under the Digital Millennium
98
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Copyright Act, meaning it is not liable for royalties for unlicensed
plays.105
The Internet has become the premiere channel for music
distribution but has also tormented rightsholders with broad
infringement and meager royalties. A free and open Internet under the
2015 Order at least protects rightsholders from extortion or competition
based on paid prioritization. The repeal of the bright-line rule against
paid prioritization may force musicians to counter ISPs as well as the
streaming services to ensure their work reaches an audience in return
for fair compensation.
IV ANALYSIS OF MUSIC WITHOUT A FREE AND OPEN INTERNET:
THREE SCENARIOS
Before understanding the impacts on music diversity, it is worth
noting what kind of Internet access issues would have legal standing
following the repeal of net neutrality. The FCC’s draft order states that
the Federal Trade Commission, rather than the FCC will be able to
exercise dominion over ISPs.106 This narrows the public interest to
consumer protection and anticompetitive actions. This notably omits
prior considerations, namely viewpoint diversity as protected under the
2015 Open Internet Order.107 Part of the Internet’s success, especially
for music, undoubtedly relied on the democratic creation and sharing
of content. Although it may not be protected, net-neutrality principles
at least recognize the value of music diversity because it promotes a
diverse array of artists and viewpoints.
Without an interest in preserving viewpoint diversity, content
creators and musicians will likely be subject to three possible scenarios
to continue accessing an audience. First, content creators will need to
contract with zero-rated services to achieve the broadest distribution of
their work. Second, artists will need to pursue alternative markets
despite the fact that many genres rely on the Internet because
alternative markets are not easily available. Finally, ISPs will claim
editorial rights and will need to clarify their obligations as curators.
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A. Zero-Rating and Paid Preference
First, music distribution platforms are likely candidates to be zerorated by ISPs. Under this practice, an edge provider or third party pays
the broadband provider to receive various benefits in reaching the end
user. This form of paid-prioritization exemplifies broadband providers
exercising discrimination. Zero-rating creates a competitive edge
amongst edge providers because it incentivizes end users to favor
certain content sources. By zero-rating their content, edge providers
can pay to avoid throttling and blocking or subsidize end user’s data
usage, meaning user’s access does not count towards their data cap.108
If a music service is zero rated, artists are forced to rely on that sole
distributor who then has substantial bargaining power when it comes
to negotiating royalties because the audience is incentivized to use that
service.
Zero-rating in the forms of subsidized and sponsored data has
already been adopted by wireless Internet providers trying to test the
boundaries of the FCC’s 2015 Order, which permitted zero-rating on
ad hoc basis until more conclusions on the value of the practice could
be drawn.109 AT&T introduced a “Sponsored Data” plan open to any
edge provider to subsidize user traffic in 2014.110 T-Mobile
implemented similar sponsored data programs for music and video.111
“Music Freedom,” the network’s music service, zero-rated Apple
Music, Pandora, Spotify, and Google play among more than a dozen
other music streaming services that continues to expand as T-Mobile
customers can vote to add additional music streaming services.112
T-Mobile’s music program stands out because the data is not
subsidized by the benefitting edge providers, in this case the streaming
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services.113 This drew divisive support from some net-neutrality
proponents because featured edge providers are not extorted, and the
anticompetitive blight is diluted by creating a competitive market
between the zero-rated services.114 Arguably, some of these services
can even serve music diversity if they focus on niche genres. However,
a more categorical view of Music Freedom recognizes the plan’s
dangers.115 T-Mobile preferences certain data, regardless of who pays
for it. Benign discrimination is no less discrimination. It still excludes
edge providers who are not yet zero-rated under Music Freedom and
therefore creates a competitive edge against those sites. Indeed,
YouTube is the most popular music streaming service but is not
covered under music freedom.116 While neither the streaming service
nor user would pay for music streaming under Music Freedom, TMobile never disclosed who was subsidizing the data. Early in Pai’s
tenure as Chairman, the FCC dropped investigations into the matter.117
This abdication of responsibility was a primary step in repealing net
neutrality rules including the “general conduct standard” that allowed
the FCC to challenge unreasonable conduct that threatened the public
interest.118 Once a site does qualify for Music Freedom subsidization,
it remains to be seen whether there is innovative competition between
the providers. The niche genre services provided may not be
competitive with Pandora, Spotify, or Apple Music who have marketed
to broader tastes rather than music-focused communities.
Ultimately, the debate regarding zero-rating completely ignores
the role of the music creator, instead focusing on the audience and
distributor. Music creators must still go through many of the same
popular distributors who refuse to provide substantial pay in order to
reach an audience. Further, zero-rating services like YouTube
maintains demand in a market rife with unlicensed music that does not
confer royalties to artists.
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B. Alternative Markets
If streaming services abuse their bargaining power to lower
royalty rates, artists must seek alternative markets to reach their
audience. A similar shift to alternative markets occurred with the dawn
of peer-to-peer file sharing programs such as Napster and Limewire
because copyright holders no longer received royalties in online
markets.119 Artists would rely on live performances, broadcasters, and
unit sales, such as CDs or the revitalized industry of vinyl records, for
income. Essentially, artists would have to regress in the methods of
revenue they could rely on. Radio lost a substantial portion of its
audience to digital music access at the outset of online music markets
and that exodus only continued to grow following the 2015 Order.120 If
artists cannot survive on online streaming royalties, they may
discontinue licensing to the services and more actively grant licenses
for broadcasters. As a result, the audience may follow the artists to the
alternative medium.
A select number of artists have successfully bucked the streaming
services and relied on alternative markets. In 2014, Taylor Swift argued
that “music should not be free” and removed her catalogue, consisting
of four albums at the time, from Spotify.121 Less than a year later, Swift
posted an open letter to Apple Music on a social media profile, again
removing her catalogue from the streaming service for refusing to pay
royalties during the service’s three-month free trial offer for users.122
Swift’s music eventually returned to both platforms but not before
creating a dialogue regarding whether streaming service royalties were
fair when alternative methods of music distribution were available.
Although, streaming services may not be ideal, alternative
methods may not suffice for every artist. As a household name with a
massive following, Swift could count on her fans to seek and purchase
her album released several weeks after leaving streaming services.
Artists without a comparable reputation may not be able to rely on
alternative markets or have the bargaining power to make streaming
services change their policies.123 Swift made a similar admission in her
119
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op-ed declaring her break with Spotify, “Some artists will be like
finding ‘the one.’ We will cherish every album they put out until they
retire.”124 Ultimately, only the biggest names may be able to
successfully shift to alternate markets, leaving niche genres and artists
trapped among prioritized streaming services.
In addition, artists rely on the Internet for more than distributing
their works. Advertising events, coordinating venues, and selling
merchandise all primarily happen over social media.125 This
adaptability makes social media outlets ripe targets for paid
prioritization. As a result, prioritized outlets would have substantial
bargaining power because they would provide access to the desired
audience and could pass the costs of prioritization onto the artists. The
rate to “boost” one’s band on social media could potentially be
exacerbated if the market concentrates into a few services.126 While
focusing on ISPs and end users in the Restoring Internet Freedom
Order, the FCC falls short because it fails to recognize content creators’
dependence on the Internet. Sadly, the dialogue between demanding
consumers and service providers regarding music revenue and online
distribution methods has largely excluded musicians in their role as
content creators.127 Therefore, artists would need alternatives for
streaming, publicizing, and merchandising at which point the audience
may not follow unless the artist famous enough to work independent of
online services.
Another suggested alternative market would require wholly new
infrastructure. Entertainment is expected to become the dominant
majority of Internet traffic and may require an alternate Internet
“backbone” to separate entertainment from essential infrastructure,
reducing network strain.128 Reducing the network strain would
arguably reduce the need to rely on paid-prioritization and throttling.129
However, under the Restoring Internet Freedom Order, ISPs would be
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permitted to prioritize and throttle at will.130 The alternate
infrastructure would not bypass traffic restrictions because ISPs are no
longer motivated to throttle based on an overburdened network but
instead for their own gain.131 So long as the incentive and ability to
profit from prioritization, blocking, or throttling persists, broadband
providers will restrict data access.
Alternative markets only provide limited solutions and they can
only benefit a limited number of artists who could persuade their
audience to abandon the online market. Therefore, alternative markets
may not be able to benefit smaller artists and genres.
C. Music Subject to ISPs’ “Editorial Discretion”
The FCC’s Restoring Internet Freedom Order does not expressly
stipulate that ISP’s will be able to practice editorial discretion, but it is
possible considering the Order’s rejection of past precedents. In
Verizon, the broadband provider argued restrictions on different
treatment of data violated the ISP’s editorial discretion.132 While
Verizon was decided on administrative procedural grounds, the court
in U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. F.C.C.. expressly denied that ISPs have
editorial discretion because they neither select nor produce content,
meaning any editorial discretion would interfere with the virtuous cycle
of content creation, consuming, and sharing.133 But once broadband
providers can discriminate via throttling, blocking, and preferencing,
they would have the ability to effectively curate content. In the case of
paid-prioritization, some subsidized data has direct and related
financial support, such as AT&T’s sponsored data plan. However,
questions arise where the subsidizing party remains confidential, as in
T-Mobile’s Music Freedom service. By benefitting certain services and
providers without a clear financial reason, T-Mobile exercises editorial
discretion in what content and providers are subsidized.
ISPs’ curating amounts to corporate expression, which the
Supreme Court has recognized as protected under the First
Amendment.134 Previously, ISPs had limited speech rights because
they simultaneously enjoyed immunity for illegal content made
available by users accessing the ISPs’ services.135 Speech rights are not
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new to mass communications organizations. Newspapers and new
media who exercise editorial discretion are subject to a public interest
standard that varies depending on the outlet. Restrictions on
newspapers’ editorial discretion that supposedly advance the public
interest must survive strict scrutiny.136 Regulations that curb
broadcasters’ editorial discretion need only survive an unclear but
lesser form of heightened scrutiny because broadcast uses
electromagnetic spectrum, a limited resource.137
The issue for the courts would be drawing an analogous model of
discretion between other forms of new media and the Internet. Thus
far, the Supreme Court’s underwhelming understanding of the Internet
likened it to a “vast library” and shopping mall for all of the available
services.138 This view parallels other new media models where the
technology acts to facilitate the user’s receipt of information. ISPs can
defend the practice of curating and restricting content based on this
model because the Internet is not considered a traditional public forum
where speech restrictions are at their weakest. The Supreme Court
refused to recognize the Internet as a traditional public forum because
they refused to hold other forms of new media to the same standard.139
However, this view arguably ignores the most compelling aspect of the
Internet, the ease for a user to actually produce and spread
information.140 A select few are able to distribute information via
newspaper, radio, or cable. Internet access naturally carries the ability
for any participant to contribute. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s model
for speech on the Internet needs desperate revamping before ISP
discretion is reviewed. As a result, recognizing and protecting ISPs’
corporate speech rights simultaneously stymies users’ speech rights to
participate on the Internet as a general forum.141
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Regardless of a future court’s interpretation, niche music genres
are threatened unless the music industry reframes its interest to better
accommodate artists or the FCC recognizes the fundamental value of
content providers in the virtuous circle and prioritizes their speech
rights over ISPs. The sobering reality of the FCC’s repeal of its net
neutrality regime is the lack of novel revelations. Pai’s FCC abandons
content providers, for example musical artists. Although courts have
endorsed the “virtuous circle” theory of artists distributing their content
online, accessing users who further broadcast the work,142 Pai has
chosen to ignore edge provider and information access. The FCC’s
abrogation of its core methodology is self-destructive, instead favoring
ISP profits.
III.

MUSIC AND THE “PUBLIC INTEREST”

The FCC’s general duty is to ensure wired and wireless
communications further the public interest because the electromagnetic
spectrum is a limited resource in the communications context.143
Following the repeal of net neutrality protections, music must rely on
alternative markets for artists to reach audiences.144 The primary
alternative market for distribution of recordings will involve both unitsales and broadcasting. Typically, a consumer does not purchase an
album without first sampling it by listening to some of the songs on the
album. Based on this process, broadcast and radio has traditionally
acted as the introduction to the music, gaining initial interest until the
consumer decides to purchase the album for their own use. Therefore,
alternative markets will inevitably rely on the broadcasting and music
will be subject to the relevant public interest standard if artists hope to
compete in the alternative market.
Congress required that radio broadcasts furthered the public
interest because they used electromagnetic spectrum.145 When it came
to defining the public interest, the FCC had to identify the values
attached to furthering the public interest as well as what parties would
be responsible for determining whether content furthered the public
interest. While the public interest remained vague, the FCC initially
determined that broadcasters would have editorial discretion and had a
duty to act as public trustees, playing content they deemed relevant to
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the public’s interest.146 While this gave DJs amorphous guidance as to
content, it failed to address how to further the public interest when
multiple broadcasters, all public trustees, were forced to compete.
Adopting an alternative model, the Federal Radio Commission
was tasked in 1929 with licensing spectrum to three competing
broadcasters in the Chicago area.147 To settle the debate, the FRC
assigned certain times and channels to the broadcasters based on the
demographic the content aimed to serve.148 This would become the
groundwork for the “marketplace” theory of public interest that would
come to replace the trustee model.149 The marketplace theory not only
settled disputes amongst trustees, it became the standard for
broadcasters to meet in order to maintain a broadcasting license.150
Broadcasters could select content that would be relevant to the market
and would be held accountable by complaints to the FCC from
members of the market who felt their interests, as the market and
public, were not being represented.151
In addition, the market could impose content restrictions by filing
complaints against broadcasters for carrying content that was patently
offensive.152 The Supreme Court in Pacifica held that a radio station
violated local norms by broadcasting George Carlin’s profanity laden
“Seven Dirty Words” routine during the mid-afternoon because a radio
audience is a captive audience; the audience therefore had limited
choices in content and had no control over the broadcasters’ editorial
discretion.153 As a result, broadcasters took on a duty to censor
themselves as part of their role serving the public interest.154
While music and radio seem to be a harmonious pair, it must be
reiterated that the Internet was the original alternate market that
replaced radio. Internet prevailed as the primary channel for music
because it was not subject to the same public interest requirements as
broadcast. Therefore, it should not be assumed that radio is an adequate
alternative for music when net neutrality can no longer preserve an
equal playing field for artists. Music largely abandoned radio years ago
146
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because the Internet let artists pursue audiences more directly with
greater freedom of expression. The music industry today, full of diverse
content relying on the Internet, could not be replicated with radio as an
alternate market.
First, music diversity and minority genres relied on the Internet
because there was not a substantial enough market share of interested
audience members to appeal to broadcasters. Broadcasters seek popular
genres with larger audiences to bring in more ad revenue. Profit
interests motivate broadcasters, not artists or diverse representation.
The second notable difference between radio and the Internet’s
music catalogues is on-demand music access. Giving the audience the
power to control what specific content they hear removes the captive
audience qualification. The Supreme Court in Pacifica specifically
drew the distinction between a captive audience and one who would
have the power to choose to listen to certain content in the privacy of
their home.155 The audience then takes on the role as curator but need
only appease themselves rather than the public interest.
Finally, because the audience is willing rather than captive,
censoring for indecency is no longer relevant. Internet music services
allowed the audience to access some music that may not be appropriate
for radio. As a result, artists were no longer restricted to reaching an
audience by the content of their music. In addition, content deigned
indecent for radio may not be lacking social value depending on the
local cultural standards and norms. In this country, music and
expression occur in the context of a pluralistic society. The variety of
cultures and viewpoints inevitably carries some strife. An agonistic
democracy requires views to compete, challenge hegemonic norms,
and protect minority views from censoring by a controlling
establishment.156 Broadcasters, serving the public interest, are
incentivized to focus on the majoritarian belief system and may selfcensor when faced with an opportunity to advance challenging
minority views. Because cultural representation is an essential part of
music diversity,157 broadcasters invariably stifle cultural viewpoints by
serving the marketplace.
Music diversity thrived under a free and open Internet because
cultural sub-genres were allowed to grow. Internet substituted radio as
the primary music channel because broadcasting lacked such openness.
155
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Forcing artists to regress back to broadcasting will only create more
restrictions on cultural representation in music.
CONCLUSION
Repealing net neutrality protections would vastly inhibit artists
from reaching audiences. While musicians have had a complicated
relationship with the Internet, balancing audience access and illegal file
sharing for instance, music diversity has been undeniably benefitted.
Communities share and critique works in genre specific forums.
Subgenres persist because they have a sustainable population of
interested audience members. Previously, artists had to rely solely on
local communities rather than global networks.
Forcing artists to rely on prioritized distribution outlets gives the
ISP and a select few edge providers substantial bargaining power over
artists, meaning the already minimal streaming royalties will continue
to decline. In addition, forcing the music industry to regress into
alternative markets will further demonstrate the necessity of a free and
open Internet. Alternative markets, namely broadcasting, are extremely
limited in their scope of interests under a marketplace model. The
public interest doctrine as applied to radio is insufficient to allow niche
genres to flourish in the face of net neutrality’s repeal. By restricting
the FCC’s definition of the public interest to preventing
anticompetitive practices, the agency ignores the true value of the
Internet: abundant content creators, simplified distribution, and
expansive audience access. Musicians are a small category of the
content creators and edge providers that the FCC’s policy ignores.
The impact of the 2017 Order on music serves as an allegory for
the Order’s effects on democracy. The FCC dismissed noneconomic
harms left unaddressed as “small.”158 As the 2017 Order faces vacatur
in court,159 those democratic concerns should not go unheard. A court
may vacate an agency action for being arbitrary and capricious.160 The
2015 Order sought to protect democratic values and expression.161 The
inversion of the FCC’s position on democratic reliance on a free and
open Internet cannot be dismissed and treated as insubstantial
compared to the protections to competitions the 2017 Order purports to
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offer.162 Artists’ voices contribute to the greater chorus of expression
reliant on net neutrality that informs and shapes democracy and culture.
The FCC’s refusal to recognize the democratic value of the Internet,
and the need for common carriage style rules to protect it, amount to
arbitrary and capricious decision-making. The FCC failed to address
the relevant and substantial impacts on democracy of repealing the
2015 Order. Such an omission amounts to grounds for vacatur.163
If left standing, Pai’s choice to repeal the Title II protections
should be viewed as a lament. It is the final song of a tragedy where the
FCC’s self-destruction has been driven by coercive forces seeking
control over a digital world. The show may go on though. Vacation of
the 2017 Order will return broadband regulation to a freer and more
open Internet, a system that greatly benefits artists and the music
industry. Rather than Wotan’s raven’s spreading the flames,
democracy may re-emerge, more akin to a phoenix, so expression may
be free from corporate gatekeeping control.
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